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Abstract
With his original reflection—deeply influenced bymany important Arabic thinkers—
Gundissalinus wanted to renovate the Latin debate concerning crucial aspects of the
philosophical tradition. Among the innovative doctrines he elaborated, one appears to
be particularly problematic, for it touches a very delicate point of Christian theology:
the divine creation of the human soul, and thus, the most intimate bond connect-
ing the human being and his Creator. Notwithstanding the relevance of this point,
Gundissalinus ascribed the creation of the human soul to the angels rather than God.
He also stated that the angels create the souls from prime matter, and through a kind
of causality which cannot be operated by God. What are the sources of this unusual
and perilous doctrine? Andwhat are the reasons which led Gundissalinus to hold such
a problematic position? This article thoroughly examines the theoretical development
and sources of Gundissalinus’s position, focusing on the correlations between this doc-
trine, the overall cosmological descriptions expounded byGundissalinus in his original
works, and the main sources upon which this unlikely doctrine is grounded: Avicenna
and Ibn Gabirol.
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1 Introduction
The problem of the origin of the human soul accompanies the history of Chris-
tian philosophy at least since Origen and Augustine.1 Acceptation and refusal
of different perspectives, such as the traducianist or the pre-existentialist posi-
tions, slowly led to an almost shared stance on the origin of the human souls,
created directly by God and infused into the body at some point during or after
conception. The emergence of a shared position in later medieval philosophy,
though, is marked by the formulation of different theories and hypotheses,
which have had less success, but yet have appeared to have influenced, some-
times slightly and quietly, the Latin debate. By this point of view, the decades
between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries
are among themost fascinating periods ofWestern philosophy. Circulation and
appropriation of fresh newArabic andGreek knowledge provided the bases for
different approaches to themain problems engagedwith by the Latin tradition,
often producing rather peculiar doctrines.
One of the most striking examples of the cross-cultural pollination which
marked those decades is provided by the works of Dominicus Gundissalinus
(ca 1125—post 1190). Latin translator of important Arabic works,2 Gundissal-
inus is a main character of the twelfth-century translation movement which
found in Toledo its most eminent venue. Gundissalinus, though, also engaged
with philosophical reflection, producing a set of philosophical treatises.3 In
these works, the Toledan philosopher realised a rather peculiar theoretical
merging among Latin and Arabic sources, directly and crucially contributing
to the intricate process of doctrinal appropriation of Arabic philosophy in the
central decades of the Middle Ages.
Many of Gundissalinus’s original doctrines are grounded on a syncretic
approach: the main characteristic of his speculation, indeed, is Gundissali-
nus’s attempt at according two opposite philosophical perspectives, that is,
1 See Pier F. Beatrice, The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-Augustinian Sources (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Ronnie J. Rombs, Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul:
Beyond O’Connell and His Critics (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press,
2006); and Benjamin P. Blosser, Become Like the Angels: Origen’s Doctrine of the Soul (Wash-
ington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012).
2 See Dag N. Hasse and Andreas Büttner, “Notes on Anonymous Twelfth-Century Translations
of Philosophical Texts fromArabic into Latin on the Iberian Peninsula,” inTheArabic,Hebrew,
andLatinReception of Avicenna’s Physics andCosmology, ed. byDagN.Hasse andAmosBerto-
lacci (Berlin—Boston: De Gruyter, 2018), 313–70.
3 See Nicola Polloni, Domingo Gundisalvo. Una introducción (Madrid: Sindéresis, 2017), 17–38.
gundissalinus on the angelic creation of the human soul 315
Oriens 47 (2019) 313–347
those elaborated by Avicenna and Ibn Gabirol.4 Gundissalinus translated the
major works of these two thinkers—Avicenna’s Liber de philosophia prima and
Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae—and he tried to combine their opposed outcomes, in
manyways, to address different problems, fromcosmology to ontology andpsy-
chology.
This process of theoretical synthesis—whose outcomes are sometimes
bizarre—is possibly the most original point of Gundissalinus’s speculation.
Nonetheless, its accomplishment required him to profoundly problematize his
own reflection. His initial adhesion to Ibn Gabirol’s metaphysics underwent a
gradual reassessment through a progressive encounter with Avicenna’s works,
through a long and complex process which found its most outstanding point
in Gundissalinus’s ontology. Traces of this problematization, though, can be
detected throughout Gundissalinus’s philosophical production. The present
contribution aims at presenting a non-immediately perspicuous aspect of this
theoretical merging of Avicenna’s and Ibn Gabirol’s perspectives: Gundissali-
nus’s position on the creation of the human souls, performed not by God, but
by the angels. Hopefully, this examination will offer a meaningful example of
both Gundissalinus’s attitude and his attempt at renovating the Latin philo-
sophical debate.
2 Intelligences, Spheres, and Souls
Possibly the last work authored by Gundissalinus, De processione mundi is a
curious treatise dealing with metaphysical and cosmological features. Gun-
dissalinus grounds his account of the process of cosmic institution mainly on
Hermann of Carinthia’s De essentiis, at the same time following quite strictly
the ‘metaphysical procedure’ presented in al-Fārābī’s Catalogue of Sciences
(Kitāb Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm, or De scientiis).5 In turn, the metaphysical bases of Gun-
dissalinus’s cosmological description are rooted inAvicenna’s and IbnGabirol’s
perspectives. Divine creation corresponds to the coming into existence of the
ontological principles of every created being,which arematter and form.6After
4 For a thorough examination of Gundissalinus’smetaphysics and his use of sources, seeNicola
Polloni, Glimpses of the Invisible: Gundissalinus’s Ontology of Matter and Form (Toronto: Pon-
tifical Institute of Medieval Studies), forthcoming.
5 See Nicola Polloni, “Gundissalinus’s Application of al-Farabi’s Metaphysical Programme.
A Case of Epistemological Transfer,” Mediterranea: International Journal on the Transfer of
Knowledge 1 (2016): 69–106.
6 See, in particular, Gundissalinus, De processionemundi: Estudio y edición crítica del tratado de
D. Gundisalvo, ed. by Soto Bruna and Alonso Del Real (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1999), 156,4–160,12.
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coming into existence, matter and form are joined together by God into what
Gundissalinus calls the first composition (primaria compositio), which gives
origin to three genera of beings: angels, celestial spheres, and elements. These
are the first offspring (primaria genitura), caused directly by God, but also, and
especially, the agents of an instrumental causality throughwhich the sublunary
world is finally originated.7
The causation of the sensible world by this secondary cause is enacted
through two different kinds of causality: secondary composition (secundaria
compositio) and generation (generatio). Through them, the imitative causality
of the angels, the perpetual movement of the spheres, and the natural power
intrinsic to the elements bring the sublunary world forth into existence, estab-
lishing its natural processes and concluding the causative dynamic initiated by
the creation of matter and form—which, consequently, is entirely governed by
God’s immediate and mediated causality.
Gundissalinus describes the physical causality of natural world as a vertical
chain of causes, which is the outcome of the causal interplay among the three
first genera of beings:
For the philosophers say that by the service of the angels new souls are
created every day from matter and form, and the celestial souls are also
moved. Moreover, by the motion of the heavens and higher bodies, many
things are produced in these lower bodies. For, because the celestial bod-
ies contain these lower bodieswithin themselves and are contiguouswith
them and because the higher bodies are always in motion, it is certainly
necessary that these bodies be moved according to the motion of them.
For, when some large body is moved, it is necessary that a small body that
is united to it within it be moved. Since, however, these lower bodies are
7 See Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, 154,5–20. It should be noticed that Gundissalinus’s
theory of secondary causation is based on the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms.
God’s creative activity is immediate only regarding the highest level of reality, which corre-
sponds to the genera of the first offspring. These entities are hylomorphic beings made of
a single matter and at least three forms: unity and substantiality—the components of ‘sub-
stance’ in general—which are further specified by the form of spirituality (in the case of the
angels) or the form of corporeality (as it is the case for the elements). Since in caused beings
complication and multiplication correspond to a higher number of forms joining the hylo-
morphic compound, the secondary offspring, lower and instituted by the secondary cause,
will have a much more composited being made of a greater number of specific and generic
forms, in a progressive degradation into multiplicity of the simplicity of God’s first creation.
Consequently, the causation performed by the secondary causes corresponds, implicitly but
also evidently, to an ‘imitation’ of God’s creative act, although lacking the ability to perform
with equal power in neither causation or efficiency.
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moved, it is necessary that they bemixed among themselves. But because
they have contrary qualities, as happens in every mixture, because that
which is stronger acts upon the other, it happens that of the bodies that
are produced by the mingling one is said to be hotter or colder or wet-
ter or drier than another from the quality that works more forcefully in
the mixture; one is said to be brighter, such as sapphire, another darker,
such as onyx; and one is prepared to be a receptacle of vegetative life
like a plant, another to be receptive of sensitive life like an animal body,
and another to be receptive of rational life like a human body. Therefore,
because as a result of the motion of the higher bodies these lower bodies
are mixed and because from their mixture the different temperaments
arise for bodies, the motions of the higher bodies are rightly called a sec-
ondary cause.However, themotion of the higher bodies candonothing in
these lower bodies except by the support of nature. For, using themotion
of higher bodies, it acts in some bymixing and changing, as, for example,
in congealed things; it nourishes some by attracting, retaining, digesting
nutriment, by expelling waste, as, for example, in living things; it moves
some by generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration,
and change with respect to place.8
8 Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, 214,12–216,14: “Ministerio enim angelorum dicunt phi-
losophi ex materia et forma novas cotidie creari animas, caelos etiam moveri. Item motu
etiam caelorum et superiorum corporummulta fiunt in his inferioribus. Quia enim caelestia
corpora continent haec inferiora intra se et contigua sunt cum illis, superiora autem sem-
per in motu sunt, profecto necesse est, ut ad motum eorum et ista moveantur. Cum enim
quodammagnum corpus movetur, necesse est, ut parvum corpus, quod intra se est sibi coni-
unctum, moveatur. Cum autem ista inferiora moveantur, necessario et ipsa intra se commis-
centur; sed quia contrariarum qualitatum sunt, (ideo, sicut fit in omni commixtione, quia,
quod praevalet, agit in aliud), contingit, ut corporum, quae ex ipsorum permixtione fiunt,
a qualitate, quae in permixtione fortius operatur, aliud alio calidius vel frigidius vel humid-
ius vel siccius dicatur et aliud claritatis, ut hyacinthus, aliud obscuritatis, ut onychinus, aliud
vitae vegetabilis, ut planta, aliud vitae sensibilis, ut corpus animalis, aliud vitae rationalis,
ut humanum corpus, receptibile praeparetur. Quia igitur ex motu superiorum corporum
haec inferiora commiscentur, ex quorum commixtione diversae corporibus complexiones
innascuntur; ideo motus superiorum merito secundaria causa appellantur. Motus autem
superiorum in his inferioribus nihil operari potest, nisi adminiculo naturae. Ipsa enim motu
superiorum utens quaedam agit commiscendo et convertendo, ut in congelatis; quaedam
nutrit attrahendo, retinendo, nutrimentum digerendo, expellendo, ut in animatis; quaedam
movet generando, corrumpendo, augmentando, diminuendo, alterando et secundum locum
mutando.” English translation by John A. Laumakis, The Procession of theWorld (Milwaukee:
MarquetteUniversity Press, 2002), 73–74. It should be noticed that, while Laumakis translates
fromBülow’s critical edition, the new edition by Soto Bruna andAlonsoDel Real is consistent
with the English rendering. I modify Laumakis’s translation whenever necessary.
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Through themovement impressed to the celestial spheres, the angels are the
remote origin of physical causality. The contiguity among the spheres causes
their movement to mingle the mass which lays in the middle of the spheres,
the elemental mass of the sublunary world, whose elements are consequently
mixed into bodies of different complexions. This celestial intermingling of the
elements, though, is neither disordered nor chaotic—aposition utterly refused
by Gundissalinus, who harshly criticizes Hugh of St Victor’s position on pri-
mordial chaos in De processione. To the contrary, the natural power which is
intrinsic to the elements governs the continuous process of generation and cor-
ruption in the sublunaryworld, actingupon theminglingmovement impressed
by the spheres. In this way, new compositions (and corruptions) of elemental
conglomerates (elementata) and corporeal bodies are produced by the sec-
ondary cause, through the causal modalities of secondary composition and
generation mentioned above.9
This intriguing theory of Deprocessione can be summarised by the following
scheme:
9 Aside from the quoted passage, Gundissalinus is rather meagre in giving specific details on
the differences between secondary composition and generation, and the modalities through
which these causative processes are performed. The absence of a detailed exposition of this
point creates a feeble, but crucial tensionbetween thepossible interpretations of the text.The
reasonof that absencemight lay inGundissalinus’s applicationof themetaphysicalprocedure
‘described’ by al-Fārābī, while these features are evidently addressed by natural philosophy
rather than metaphysics.
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Ata first glance,Gundissalinus’s account appears tobequiteplain and linear.
Nonetheless, the excerpt quoted above mentions a second causative function
performed by the angels. Beside moving the spheres, indeed, Gundissalinus
writes that “the philosophers say that by the service of the angels new souls
are created every day from matter and form.”10 This assertion evidently com-
plicates the proposed causal scheme. Gundissalinus’s mention of this further
angelic action may be referred to Avicenna’s cosmology: indeed, in book IX
of his Philosophia prima, Avicenna describes the cosmic institution through a
threefold causative and gnoseological process operated by the intelligence and
giving origin to the cosmic souls and spheres.11 For Avicenna, the first intelli-
gence has cognition of the necessary existence of its cause, God, originating
another intelligence. At the same time, the intelligence has also cognition of
the mediated necessity of its own being as caused by God, cognition which
causes the existence of the cosmic soul, and whichmoves the third entity orig-
inated by this process, the celestial sphere, coming forth from the intelligence’s
comprehension of its own possible existence. This cosmogonic description
surely influenced Gundissalinus, whom evidently refers to this process while
stating that:
For it principallymoves the intelligence through itself without anymeans.
But, according to the philosophers, the intelligences create the souls that
move the heavens. Themotion of the elements, however, follows from the
motion of the heavens. But from themotion of the elements, there comes
themixing of the elements. Theirmixing, however, is the procreator of all
the things in this lower world.12
The source of this passage appears to be Avicenna.13 Some philosophers, Gun-
dissalinus says, claim that the intelligences, that is, the angels, create the souls
10 Gundissalinus,Deprocessionemundi, 214,12–13: “Ministerio enim angelorumdicunt philo-
sophi ex materia et forma novas cotidie creari animas, caelos etiammoveri.”
11 See Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, ed. by Simone Van Riet, vol. 2 (Louvain: Peeters,
Leiden: Brill, 1980), 483,85–91.
12 Gundissalinus, De processione mundi, 220,17–222,5: “Quaedam enim movet per se nullo
mediante et quaedam non per se, sed mediantibus aliis. Principaliter enim per se nullo
mediante intelligentiammovet. Intelligentiae vero secundumphilosophos creant animas,
quae movent caelos; ex motu vero caelorum sequitur motus elementorum. Sed ex motu
elementorumprovenit commixtio eorum; ex commixtione vero eorumper conversionem
et generationem procreatur rerum omnium, haec ultima inferius universitas.” English
translation by Laumakis, 75.
13 Gundissalinus’s reference to a process of causation “mediante intelligentia” is intriguing.
The same reference appears twice in Gundissalinus’s works (see note 22). At a first glance,
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quae movent caelos, which move the heavens. These are surely to be identified
with the celestial souls which move the planetary spheres. At the same time,
though, how can these celestial souls be the souls created cotidie, that is, daily
by the angels to which Gundissalinus refers in the excerpt from De processione
mundi quoted above? Evidently, any identification of the celestial souls with
the everyday created soulswould imply a contradiction, since the celestial souls
are caused only once, ictu oculi, and before the beginning of time.
Consequently, the only possible solution to this impasse seems to be pro-
vided by the identification of the souls created every day by the angels with the
individual souls of sensible beings—that is to say, the three species of rational,
sensible, and vegetative souls. If this is the correct interpretation of this pas-
sage, as it appears to be, two fundamental outcomes are implied by Gundissal-
inus’s line of reasoning:
1. vegetative and sensible souls which animate, respectively, plants and ani-
mals are caused by the angels;
2. human souls, too, are directly caused by the angels: as a result, any direct
bond betweenGod and human being is removed in favor of angelicmedi-
ation.
Ascribing to the angels the creation of the souls, Gundissalinus neatly distin-
guishes between the superlunary and sublunary worlds as two realms sub-
ject to different kinds of causative institution. On the one hand, the superlu-
nary world is caused directly by God through creation and first composition.
On the other hand, the sublunary world is caused by the secondary cause,
which performs generation and secondary composition, the latter character-
ized by a higher ontological complexity in comparison to primary composition.
the mention of a mediated causation of this kind seems to be textually and doctrinally
close to the Liber de causis. Although fascinating, the hypothesis that the Liber de causis
had been a source of Gundissalinus’s metaphysics finds almost no further textual or doc-
trinal correspondence beside these two references to a causation “mediante intelligentia,”
which can be justified by appealing to Avicenna rather than the Liber de causis. In addi-
tion, Pattin’s hypothesis that the Liber de causishadbeen translated byGerard of Cremona
and revised by Gundissalinus has been rejected by most scholars. See Adriaan Pattin, “Le
LiberdeCausis,”Tijdschrift voorFilosofie 28 (1966): 90–203;AdriaanPattin, “Autourdu Liber
de Causis: Quelques réflexions sur la récente littérature,”Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philoso-
phie und Theologie 41 (1994): 354–88; and Richard C. Taylor, “Remarks on the Latin Text
and the Translator of the Kalam fi mahd al-khair/Liber de causis,” Bulletin de Philosophie
Médiévale 31 (1989): 75–102. Notwithstanding these limitations, the mystery surrounding
the translation and first reception of the Liber de causis is surely worth a global reassess-
ment also in consideration of the events that took place in Toledo in the second half of
the twelfth century.
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Consequently, the doctrine of the angelic creation of the souls provides sublu-
nary things with a deep homogeneity as for both cause and ontological struc-
ture.
3 Angels and Human Souls
Specifically focused on cosmology and metaphysics, De processione mundi
mentions the doctrine of angelic creation of the souls only in reference to
the discussion of the causative functions performed by the secondary cause.
A much more detailed treatment of the origin of the soul is presented in
Gundissalinus’s De anima, a treatise which, as the title suggests, is centered on
the discussion of the soul (its origin, composition, and faculties).
The fifth chapter of the treatise is dedicated to the examination of how the
souls—vegetative, sensible, and rational—come forth into existence. In the
first place, Gundissalinus clarifies that the souls must come to be every day.14
It should be noticed that the daily creation of the souls claimed in De anima is
a rather peculiar case of ‘creation.’ It is called ‘creation’ only analogically, and
it is not the creatio ex nihilo, which is proper to God only, and limited to the
creation of prime matter and form. Gundissalinus’s acceptation of universal
hylomorphism is radical: every caused being is composed of matter and form,
since God’s creation from nothing corresponds to the causation of matter and
form from and through which each and every creature comes to be. As a con-
sequence, not only the angels, but also the souls must be composed of matter
and form: universal hylomorphism necessarily implies psychological hylomor-
phism. As a result, the souls are not created from nothing, but frommatter:
Consequently, although it is said that new human souls are created every
day, nonetheless, they appear to be created not from nothing but from
primematter. If all being comes forth by form, therefore, the rational soul
has being only by the form, but the form has being only when it is in mat-
ter. Consequently, the form by which the rational soul comes forth into
being, is in matter, and therefore, the soul appears to consist of matter
and form.15
14 See Gundissalinus, De anima, published under the title El Tractatvs de anima atribuido a
Dominicvs Gvundi[s]salinvs, ed. by Soto Bruna and Alonso Del Real (Pamplona: EUNSA,
2009), 124,3–9.
15 Gundissalinus, De anima, 158,20–160,2: “Quamvis ergo humanae animae cotidie novae
creari dicantur, non tamen de nihilo, sed de materia prima creari videntur. Si enim omne
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Gundissalinus’s claim of the material origin of the souls is perfectly coinci-
dent with the excerpt from De processione quoted above: that the creation of
the souls, indeed, corresponds to a second phase of the cosmic institution, per-
formed by the secondary cause. The justification of this point in De anima is
pursued by Gundissalinus expositing how ‘the philosophers’ have proven that
the souls are created by the angels rather than by God.
The first demonstration states that, since every creature desires God, there
would be no reason why the souls would have abandoned Him to join the
bodies, if God were their creator. Consequently, since new souls are evidently
created and join the bodies every day, God cannot be their direct cause.16 At
the same time, with the second argument Gundissalinus makes clear that the
causation of the souls follows a deliberation of their author, who judged the
existence of any given soul as better than its non-existence. Deliberative pro-
cess, though, implies a change of status of the cause. Since God is completely
perfect, nothing new can happen toHim, and thereforeHe cannot be the cause
of the souls.17
The third demonstration is focused on the examination of the modalities of
causation. God only creates ex nihilo, while any further kind of causation acts
upon something which already exists. Since the souls are created frommatter,
therefore, they cannot be the effect of God’s direct causality:
Also, another proof. The first Maker only produces something from noth-
ing. But it will be demonstrated later that the soul comes forth from
matter. Consequently, it is not a product of the first Maker. Moreover,
being created or coming forth into being corresponds to [the thing] pass-
ing from potency into act (effectus). Nonetheless, [the thing] passes from
potency into act only by virtue of somethingwhich is [already] in act. The
firstMaker, though, is neither in potency nor in act: the soul, indeed, does
not pass from potency into act by virtue of Him, and therefore, it is not
created by Him.18
esse ex formaest, profecto rationalis animanonhabet esse nisi per formam; sed formanon
habet esse nisi in materia; forma igitur qua anima rationalis est non est nisi in materia; ac
per hoc anima videtur constare ex materia et forma.”
16 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,17–22.
17 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,22–130,19.
18 Gundissalinus, De anima, 130,20–132,4: “Item alia probatio: factoris primi facere est facere
aliquid ex nihilo; sed postea probabitur animam fieri ex materia; igitur non est factura
primi factoris. Item creari vel fieri est exire de potentia ad effectum. Nihil autem exit de
potentia ad effectumnisi per aliud quod est in effectu; primus vero factor nec est in poten-
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Considerationof thematerial origin of the souls implies another demonstra-
tion. Acting upon matter, the causation of the soul corresponds to the actual-
ization of a potency which, in turn, can be actualized only by something which
is already in act. God, though, is neither potency nor act, therefore He cannot
actualize the potency of the soul into its act. In addition to that, the passage
from potency into act corresponds to a kindmovement: as a result, if Godwere
the cause of the souls, He should be subject tomovement, something inadmis-
sible for He is completely perfect, thus immobile.19
A further proof proposed by Gundissalinus is centered on the difference
between mediated and immediate causality. The point of departure of his line
of reasoning is that the immediate reception of something is worthier than its
mediated appropriation, therefore, the effect of the former is nobler than that
of the latter. If this is true, considering that the intelligence is worthier and
nobler than the soul, it must be assumed that only the former is caused byGod,
with no mediation, while the less noble status of the soul is a consequence of
being the effect of an intermediary.20
Finally, the last demonstration is based on the consideration of finite and
infinitemovement: themovement impressed by something infinite per semust
be infinite. To the contrary, souls have finite movement due to the limitedness
of their substance: therefore, the finite movement of the soul must be per-
formed sine medio by something which is finite per se, and that entity cannot
be God.21
Touching different aspects of their causation, Gundissalinus’s set of proofs
aims at demonstrating that God cannot be said to be the direct cause of the
souls’ creation. Their direct cause must be a finite and mobile entity, which is
in act, has deliberative reason, and performs the intermediary causation of the
existence of every single soul following God’s will. Accordingly, these entities
are the angels. Acting upon matter to create new souls, the angels do not per-
form anything but the realization of God’s will, being the instrumental cause
of the cosmogonic institution which is utterly governed by God. This relation
between God and the angels is marked by the terms of “service” (ministerium)
and “authority” (auctoritas), posited by Gundissalinus in strict (and evocative)
analogy to the administration of sacraments:
tia nec in effectu; igitur per illumnonexit animadepotentia ad effectum. Ergonon creatur
ab illo.”
19 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 132,1–13.
20 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 132,14–19.
21 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 134,1–18.
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For what the philosophers demonstrate, the souls are not created by God,
but by the angels, and you can easily understand this, that is, that they
are created by the angel’s service rather than God’s. Nonetheless, when
it is said that “God creates the soul,” this sentence must be understood
as referred to divine authority, not to His service, as when it is said of
Christ that “He is the onewho baptizes,” while [it is] the priest [who] bap-
tizes. Christ does so through His authority, not His service, and the priest
does so through his service, not his authority. In a similar fashion, also the
angels create the souls through their service only, not their authority. Con-
sequently, they are not said to be the creators of the souls, since they do
not create by authority, but [by] performing a service. Everything which
uses not [its] authority, but [its] service, to act upon something, it neces-
sarily obeys what is superior [to itself] while serving. For this reason, it is
not said that the soul is a creature of the angel, but of God, for it is created
by His authority, likewise themighty worksmade by some of the servants
are attributed not to them, but to their masters, for whose order [these
works] have been made. Accordingly, as the human body receives some
action of the rational soul only through the spirit, as too the rational soul
receives the action of the first Maker only through the intelligence (medi-
ante intelligentia), that is, the angelic creature.22
The angels create the souls followingGod’s authority and enactingHiswill, per-
forming the service they are commanded to offer as instruments of God’s will.
Consequently, the ultimate cause of the creation of the souls is GodHimself. As
during baptism, while it is Christ whom baptizes, it is the priest who performs
the baptismministerio Christi; so too the angels every day create new soulsmin-
isterio Dei, performing His will and enacting His authority. As Gundissalinus
22 Gundissalinus,Deanima, 134,19–136,12: “Hoc autemquod philosophi probant, animas non
a Deo sed ab angelis creari, sane quidem potest intelligi, scilicet non Dei ministerio sed
angelorum. Et tamen cum dicitur ‘Deus creat animas,’ intelligendum est auctoritate non
ministerio, sicut cum dicitur de Christo: ‘hic est qui baptizat,’ cum sacerdos baptizet. Sed
Christus auctoritate nonministerio; sacerdos veroministerio tantum, non auctoritate; sic
et angeli creant animasministerio tantum, non auctoritate. Undenec creatores animarum
dicuntur quia in creando non auctoritate, sed ministerio funguntur. Qui enim in agendo
aliquid non auctoritate sed ministerio utitur, in ministrando utique superiori obsequitur.
Et ideo anima creatura angeli non dicitur, sed Dei, cuius auctoritate creatur, sicut et mag-
nalia quae aliquorumministri operantur non ipsis sed dominis suis quorum nutu faciunt
imputantur. Sicut ergo corpus humanumnon recipit actionem aliquam animae rationalis
nisimediante spiritu, sic et anima rationalis non recipit actionem factoris primi nisimedi-
ante intelligentia, scilicet angelica creatura.”
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remarks, this is the reason why it is commonly said that God creates the souls:
indeed, He does so through the angelic service. Grounded upon Augustine’s
discussion of baptism, while probably using Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, the
reference to the sacrament administered by the priest during baptism allows
Gundissalinus to doctrinally ground his peculiar position on the Christian tra-
dition.23
Examinationof Deanima confirms the correctness of theproposed interpre-
tation of the excerpt from De processione mundi quoted above. The souls cre-
ated cotidie by the angels are the individual sublunary souls animating plants,
animals, and human beings. Grounding psychology upon universal hylomor-
phism, and positing neat boundaries between the first and the second phase of
the cosmic establishment, Gundissalinus offers a quite original doctrine of the
origin of human souls.
4 Intelligences and Souls
Following the text of De anima, chapter V, two different thematic sections
can be distinguished, engaging respectively with two principal aspects of the
origin of the souls: its causation and its agent. The first section is dedicated
to the examination of the causal modality by which the souls are created.24
Gundissalinus posits the terms of the question on whether the souls are cre-
ated with the institution of the universe—as if they were stars, created before
the bodies and infused into them by God—or whether they are the effect of
a daily creation. The former, though, cannot be the case: the soul cannot pre-
exist the body.
In the first place, any supposition that the souls were created before the bod-
ies faces a crucial contradiction. In fact, before the union with their bodies, the
souls cannot have been a multitude, since all human souls are one in species
and definition. Before being joined to their bodies, then, none of them could
be identified as numerically different from the others, for there was no alter-
ity or difference among them. As a consequence, it is impossible to suppose a
multitude of souls pre-existing their union to the body.25 Moreover, Gundissa-
23 See Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, ed. by Patres Collegii S. Bonaventu-
rae (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1916), liber IV, distinctio V, cap. 2,
265,7–266.
24 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 124,3–128,16.
25 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 124,10–126,6.
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linus remarks, even if that were possible, the souls would have an esse otiosum
vel superfluum, they would be useless while nothing is useless or superfluous in
nature.26
At the same time, it is also impossible to state the opposite alternative of this
supposition, that is, that the souls were created before the bodies not as a mul-
titude, but as one soul. Each living body, indeed, has one soul, and these souls
must either be individual souls, or parts of single original souls pre-existing
the bodies. The latter, nonetheless, cannot be the case, since the souls have
no extension nor magnitude, thus, cannot be divided in potency. Nor it can
be assumed that one soul animates two bodies.27 As a consequence, the souls
do not pre-exist the bodies, and:
For this reason, it follows that new souls are created every day. In fact,
when a body suitable to become its instrument and dominion is created,
then, the intelligible causes, which are used to provide every soul, create
it. Consequently, it is impossible that the soul is createdwithout the body,
so that [the soul] is created, but not the body.28
This excerpt clearly states that the souls are created and infused into the bod-
ies by the intelligible causes. It is also a direct quotation from Avicenna’s De
anima, V, 4. Actually, the entire discussion of themodality of the soul’s creation
is derived from chapters 3 and 4 of the fifth book of Avicenna’s psychological
work, but in a way quite characteristic of Gundissalinus’s use of his sources.
For Avicenna, the soul is an immaterial and separated substancewhich joins
the body as its instrument to realize its perfection.29 In book V, chapter 3, Avi-
cenna engageswith two crucial problems: the interplay of reason and sensation
in the rational soul,30 and the origin of the soul, whose discussion is further
developed in chapter 4, specifically considering the soul’s immortality and the
impossibility of metempsychosis.31 This last section of the two chapters is the
26 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,7–10.
27 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,10–17.
28 Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,17–21: “Quapropter consequitur ut cotidie creentur novae
animae; cum enim creatur corpus quod sit dignum fieri instrumentum et regnum eius,
tunc causae intelligibiles quae solent dare unamquamque animam creant eam. Ergo ut
anima creetur sine corpore ita ut ipsa creetur et non corpus, hoc est impossibile.”
29 For an overall examination of Avicenna’s psychology, see Meryem Sebti, Avicenne. L’âme
humaine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000).
30 SeeAvicenna, Liber de anima seu sextus denaturalibus, ed. by SimoneVanRiet (Louvain—
Leiden: Brill, 1972), 102,97–105,39.
31 See Avicenna, De anima, 105,40–126,26.
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source of Gundissalinus’s quotations. Since the two chapters have been thor-
oughly examined by Thérèse-Anne Druart,32 I will only present their general
structure and main position as regards to Gundissalinus’s reception.
In the first place, Avicenna discusses and demonstrates that the soul cannot
pre-exist the body. Human souls are one in their species and definition: conse-
quently, if they were created before the bodies, they could be neithermany nor
one in number. Concerning the former, Avicenna states that, being simple and
immaterial entities, the souls do not have any essential alterity per se, and their
multiplication only happens through their union with their matter, that is, the
body. Consequently, if the souls were created before the bodies, they could not
be many in number.33 Nevertheless, they cannot have been one either. In fact,
the recognition of a multiplicity of embodied souls would entail that the sup-
posed single soul which they were before joining their matter was divisible in
potency, something inadmissible.34 Therefore, Avicenna concludes, the souls
cannot pre-exist their bodies. The soul is created togetherwith the body, or bet-
ter, when the complexion of the body—its matter—is apt to receive the soul.
Through this dynamic, the souls are amultitude of individual entities compos-
ing one species, and each soul is joined to one body.35
Soul and body, then, are contemporaries, but not essentially related: they
come to be at the same moment, but their relation is accidental. Indeed, if it
were essential, the destruction of the body would imply that of the soul, since
they would be relatives. To the contrary, the accidental nature of their relation
manifests the immortality of the soul.36 At the same time, if the bodywere pre-
existing the soul, it would be its cause, which is impossible considering that the
body cannot be any of the four possible causes of the soul (efficient, recipient,
formal, and perfective).37 Therefore, the soul must be created when the bodily
matter is apt to receive it as its instrument, and it is created and infused into
the body by the separate causes.38
32 See Thérèse-Anne Druart, “The Human Soul’s Individuation and Its Survival After the
Body’s Death: Avicenna on the Causal Relation Between Body and Soul,” Arabic Science
and Philosophy 10 (2000): 259–73.
33 See Avicenna, De anima, 105,40–106,62.
34 See Avicenna, De anima, 107,63–69.
35 See Avicenna, De anima, 107,75–113,43.
36 See Avicenna, De anima, 113,46–114,56.
37 See Avicenna, De anima, 114,57–115,79.
38 See Avicenna, De anima, 115,80–116,82: “Cum enim creatur materia corporis quod sit
dignum fieri instrumentum animae et eius regnum, tunc causae separatae quae solent
dare unamquamque animam, creant animam.”
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Consequently, for Avicenna it is impossible to suppose that a soul can exist
without having previously been joined to a body: everything which begins to
be is preceded by a matter which is apt to receive it or have a relation with
it, which is witnessed with the souls.39 If the souls were created without their
instrument, which is the body, theywould be useless, while nothing in nature is
superfluous or useless. Consideration of this evidently implies that whenever
the bodily complexion is ready, “it follows the creation, by the separate cause,
of what is the soul,”40 in a similar fashion to every formmeant to join matter.41
The soul, indeed, is a simple entity, and its being is not attributed by the body
or a bodily virtue, but by the essence of the soul itself, which has neither mat-
ter nor extension. Body and soul are independent fromeachother: “therefore, it
remains that none of themdepends on the other: the being of the soul, though,
depends on other principles which do not change nor can be destroyed.”42
Being simple and caused by higher causes, the soul is not subject to corrup-
tion, a point demonstrated by Avicenna stressing the immateriality of the soul.
To be destroyed is only what has the potency to be destroyed (potentia destru-
endi) and the act of enduring (effectus permanendi), which are typical features
of the beings composed of matter and form. Simple and separate substances,
though, do not have a potency to be destroyed, since they are not hylomorphic
entities and have nomatter to bear contraries.43 Consequently, the soul cannot
be corrupted, and is perpetual.
Before concluding chapter 4 with the refutation of metempsychosis,44 Avi-
cenna summarizes the originating dynamic of the souls as follows:
We have already demonstrated that the souls were created and multi-
plied only together with the attitude of the bodies, since, according to the
attitude of the bodies, it is necessary to assign to the separate cause the
coming to be of the souls. It is also evident that this does not happen by
chance or fate, as if the created soul were created only because, by virtue
of the complexion [of the body], it was required to create a soul to govern
39 See Avicenna, De anima, 116,85–87.
40 Avicenna, De anima, 117,93–94: “comitatur tunc creari a causis separatis illud quod est
anima.”
41 See Avicenna, De anima, 117,94–97: “Hoc autem non contingit in anima tantum, sed in
omnibus formis habentibus initium quarum esse non praeponderat supra earum non
esse, nisi quia materia aptior est quantum ad illas et dignior illis.”
42 Avicenna, De anima, 120,32–34: “restat ergo ut nullius eorum esse pendeat ex altero; esse
autem animae pendet a principiis aliis quae non permutantur nec destruuntur.”
43 See Avicenna, De anima, 120,35–122,70.
44 See Avicenna, De anima, 125,14–126,26.
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it. To the contrary, the soul did come forth into being, but only by chance
it happened that the body came forth into being together with that [soul]
on which it would depend.45
This separate cause is the giver of forms, which causes and infuses the souls
into the bodies apt to receive them, following the different complexions the
bodies have, and provides them with the most apt of the three kinds of soul
(vegetative, sensible, and rational).46
This short examination of the contents exposited in De anima, V, 3–4,makes
clear that the origin of Gundissalinus’s account of themediated creation of the
human souls is Avicenna. Nevertheless, his use of Avicenna is rather peculiar.
In the first place, it should be noticed that Gundissalinus cherry-picks passages
from De anima, V, 3–4, re-inventing the articulation of Avicenna’s discussion
through the application of that ‘alteration strategy.’ I have already had the occa-
sion to point out regardingGundissalinus’s use of Avicenna’s Philosophia prima
in his De processione mundi.47 Also in this case, the excerpts are abridged, lin-
guistically modified, and put in a different order than the original one (see
Appendix).
In his demonstration that the souls cannot pre-exist their bodies, Gundissal-
inus mainly relies on the first argument of the second thematic section of De
anima, V, 3. He polishes the Latin text—whether checking it with the Arabic
original, or merely adapting it to its own exposition—while he maintains the
main aspects of Avicenna’s line of reasoning. From this point of view, the first
part of Gundissalinus’s argument on the impossibility of a multitude of souls
before being joined to the bodies is parallel to Avicenna’s (Appendix A and B),
simplifying it, though, and cutting away the last part which implicitly contra-
dicts Gundissalinus’s psychological hylomorphism (Appendix, C).
Before passing to the exposition of the second part of the argument (before
the bodies, the souls cannot be one either), Gundissalinus inserts a modified
excerpt from chapter 4, stating that if the souls were existing before the bod-
45 Avicenna, De anima, 124,96–2: “Iam etiam ostendimus quod animae non fuerunt creatae
et multiplicatae nisi cum aptitudine corporum, eo quod secundum aptitudinem corpo-
rum oportet attribui esse animae a causis separatis. Et patuit etiam quod hoc non fit casu
vel fato, ita ut anima creata non fuerit creata nisi quia propter complexionem debebat
creari anima quae eam regeret: sed anima habuit esse, et casu accidit ut corpus haberet
esse cul illa a quo penderet.”
46 See Sebti, Avicenne. L’âme humaine, 10–15.
47 See Nicola Polloni, “Gundissalinus on Necessary Being: Textual and Doctrinal Alterations
in the Exposition of Avicenna’s Metaphysics,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 26.1 (2016):
129–60.
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ies, they would be useless while nothing is useless in nature. The insertion of
this passage is evidently aimed at strengthening the argument from chapter 3
with an additional proof (see Appendix, D). After having quoted this passage,
Gundissalinus goes back to chapter 3 (see Appendix E), presenting the second
part of Avicenna’s argument: as the souls cannot be many in number before
joining the bodies (first part), they neither can be one (second part), since they
cannot be divisible in potency for they do not have magnitude or extension.
After that, Gundissalinus moves on to chapter 4, again, quoting the passage in
which Avicenna states that the souls are created by the separate causes when
the bodies are apt to receive them. Also in this case, Gundissalinus abstracts
the excerpt from its original context to insert it as the logical conclusion of Avi-
cenna’s first argument presented in the second section of chapter 3.
Gundissalinus, therefore, mainly quotes only one of Avicenna’s arguments,
strengthening it through textual additions fromchapter 4—and inserting slight
textual (and, consequently, doctrinal) alterations. The reason of this operation
is quite evident: Gundissalinus is trying to merge Avicenna’s argument with
his overall doctrine of the origin of the human souls and, thus, with his pecu-
liar reading of Ibn Gabirol. From this point of view, it is all but surprising that
Gundissalinus leaves aside every reference to matter found in Avicenna. Their
perspectives are opposed. Avicenna’s discussion of corruption as proper only
to beings composited of matter and form cannot be integrated into Gundissal-
inus’s doctrinal construction, where everything aside from God, matter, and
form is a hylomorphic compound. Consequently, Avicenna’s arguments engag-
ing the relation between soul andmatter are ignored byGundissalinus, and the
excerpts he quotes are duly modified in order to avoid any intrinsic contradic-
tion with the overall theory exposited in his work.
As regards to the doctrine of the angelic creation of the souls, Gundissali-
nus’s position is rooted on the addition he makes at the end of the argument
taken from De anima, V, 3 (Appendix E). Gundissalinus inserts two passages
from chapter 4. The first of them is aimed at being an improvement to Avi-
cenna’s argument, while the second provides its logical conclusions: since the
souls are neither many nor one before being joined to the bodies, they must
have been created together with the bodies, as their instruments, every day
andby the separate causes. FromGundissalinus’s systematizationof Avicenna’s
proof, the creation of the souls by the separate substances appears as a conse-
quence of the impossibility of their pre-existence to the bodies. The justifica-
tion of this assertion is provided by the set of arguments following this proof,
based on a rather different source.48
48 It should be recalled that, in the same years and location in which Gundissalinus was
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5 Hypostases, Angels, and Souls
After having demonstrated, by means of Avicenna’s argument, that the souls
are created on a daily basis by the separate causes, Gundissalinus clarifies that
this statement is valid only expartemundi, that is, in consideration of the elaps-
ing temporal dimension of the sensible universe. Indeed, “for Aristotle, time is
the measure of space containing before and after, and for others, time is the
period of which one part has gone away while another part still has to come.”49
Accordingly, only entities having extension are created in time, while the soul,
being simple, must be created in a single moment (instans), which is not in
time, for it has no prius or posterius. As a result, the souls cannot be caused by
nature, since nature only acts in time.50
The clarification of the (non-)temporal dimension of the creation of the
soul, and the consequent refusal of the hypothesis that nature is the agent of
that creation, ledGundissalinus to present the sevenproofs demonstrating that
the angels are the direct cause of the souls examined above. The source of these
proofs is Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, possibly the most important of Gundissali-
nus’s sources.
It should be recalled that the Fons vitae exposes a progressive derivation
of reality based on different hylomorphic unions realized by divine will and
the secondary causes.51 The first union of universal matter and form gives ori-
gin to the hypostatic Intelligence, which contains the forms of everything and
radiates them on what is below. In this causative process, the form of the
Intelligence becomes matter of the following hypostatical being, the rational
writing his De anima, Abraham ibn Daud engaged with this same problem, providing an
outstandingly similar solution. See Polloni, Glimpses of the Invisible, forthcoming.
49 Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,2–4. This reference to Aristotle is one of the few Gundissal-
inus makes to an actually Aristotelian content, since he tends to refer to the Greek
philosopher Arabic material, usually by Avicenna. See Nicola Polloni, “Aristotle in Toledo:
Gundissalinus, the Arabs, andGerard of Cremona’s Translations,” in ExOriente Lux:Trans-
latingWords, ScriptsandStyles in theMedievalMediterraneanWorld, ed. byCharles Burnett
and PedroMantas (Córdoba: UCOPress, London: TheWarburg Institute, 2016), 179–81. The
secondpart of Gundissalinus’s definition is derived fromPricianus, Institutionesgrammat-
icae, ed. by Heinrich Keil (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855), 414,11.
50 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,1–16.
51 As regard to IbnGabirol’s cosmology, see Sarah Pessin, “JewishNeoplatonism: Being above
Being and Divine Emanation in Solomon Ibn Gabirol and Isaac Israeli,” in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, ed. by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Lea-
man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 91–110; Fernand Brunner, “Création
et émanation: Fragment de philosophie comparée,” Studia Philosophica 33 (1973): 33–63;
and Ermenegildo Bertola, Salomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron): Vita, opere e pensiero (Padova:
Milani, 1953).
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soul, which also radiates its own essential contents without being deprived or
impoverished of anything. Again, through the circular functionality of matter
and form,52 the rational soul is followed by the sensible soul, and then by the
vegetative soul. The last layer of the vegetative soul is nature, which causes
the universal spiritual matter, the boundary between spiritual and corporeal
realms. Once the universal spiritual matter is joined to the form of corporeal-
ity, while undergoing themanifold process of spiritual radiation, the substance
sustaining the nine categories comes to be. This is a corporeal substance con-
strained by quantity, whose primary and solely function is to bear the corporeal
accidental forms of both the super- and sublunary worlds, at the center of this
cosmogonic progression.53
It is clear that Ibn Gabirol states that the intelligence causes the soul, and
in some respects, it can further be said that the intelligence causes the souls, in
plural. Nevertheless, these are the hypostatical Intelligence and the three hypo-
statical souls, instantiations of the flowing of existence that departs fromGod’s
creation of matter and soul. Ibn Gabirol’s cosmological context, therefore, is
radically different fromGundissalinus’s, who is referring to individual souls and
separate intelligences/angels following Avicenna’s perspective. Regardless, this
evident discrepancy of approach and context, the second section of Gundissal-
inus’s De anima, V, is textually grounded on Fons vitae.
The modalities by which Ibn Gabirol’s proofs are presented by Gundissali-
nus is a striking example of the latter’s alteration strategy, but also and more
importantly, an outstanding case of philosophical appropriation and transfer
of knowledge. Six out of seven proofs presented by Gundissalinus are direct
quotations from Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, duly modified to be inserted in the
former’s line of reasoning (see Appendix, G–L).
In a similar fashion to what Gundissalinus does with Avicenna’s De anima,
but in a much more pervasive way, the Toledan philosopher cherry-picks six
of the fifty-six proofs of the existence of the spiritual substances (that is, the
hypostatical intelligence and souls) presented by Ibn Gabirol in the third book
of his work.54 In order to insert them into the overall discussion of his doctrine,
52 See Nicola Polloni, “Toledan Ontologies: Gundissalinus, Ibn Daud, and the Problems of
Gabirolian Hylomorphism,” in Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism: Philosophical
and Theological Exchanges Between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions,
ed. by Alexander Fidora and Nicola Polloni (Barcelona—Roma: FIDEM, 2017), 19–49.
53 See, for instance, Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, published under the title Avencebrolis (Ibn
Gebirol) Fons vitae ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Iohanne Hispano et Dominico
Gundissalino, ed. by Claemens Baeumker, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und
Theologie des Mittelalters, vol. I.2–4 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1892–95), 43,19–48,27.
54 See Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 75,10–102,9.
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though, Gundissalinus had to consistentlymodify not the structure of the argu-
ments, but their terms. The textual comparison is stunning:
Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae Gundissalinus, De anima
And if the first Maker is the maker of
this substance by Himself, then this sub-
stance always existed with God. But this
substance did not always exist. It, there-
fore, was not made by the essence of the
first maker. Therefore, the first Maker is
not the maker of this substance by Him-
self. And since the first maker is not its
maker by himself, it will be necessary that
an intermediary exists between them.55
If the first Maker is the maker of the
souls by Himself, then the soul always
existed with Him. But the soul did not
always exist with God since new souls are
created every day. Therefore, the soul is
not made by the first Maker, and the first
Maker is not the maker of the soul by
Himself. Consequently, between God and
the soul, it is necessary an intermediary,
which is the maker of the soul.56
The making of the first Maker is to cre-
ate something from nothing. But the
substance that sustains the categories
is composed from its own simple ele-
ments. It is, therefore, not created from
nothing.57
Also, another proof. The first Maker only
produces something from nothing. But
it will be demonstrated later that the soul
comes forth frommatter. Consequently,
it is not a product of the first Maker.58
55 Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 78,5–12: “Et si factor primus fuerit factor substantiae per se, tunc
haec substantia fuit semper apud deum. Sed haec substantia non fuit semper. Ergo non
est facta ab essentia factoris primi. Ergo factor primus non est factor substantiae per se.
Et cum factor primus non fuerit factor eius per se, necesse erit ut sit medium inter illa.”
English translationby JohnA. Laumakis,TheFontof Life (Fons vitae)bySolomon ibnGabirol
(Avicebron) (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2014), 108–9. I will adapt Laumakis’s
translation whenever necessary. Here and hereafter: bold, italics, and bold italics added
for emphasis.
56 Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,18–22: “… si factor primus est factor animae per se, tunc
anima semper fuit apud eum; sed anima non semper fuit apud Deum quoniam cotidie
creantur novae; igitur anima non est facta a primo factore, nec primus factor est factor
eius per se. Igitur necesse est ut aliquid sit medium inter Deum et animam, quod sit fac-
tor animae.”
57 Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 79,18–20: “Facere factoris primi est creare aliquid ex nihilo. Et sub-
stantia quae sustinet praedicamenta composita est ex suis simplicibus. Ergononest creata
ex nihilo.” English translation by Laumakis, 109.
58 Gundissalinus, De anima, 130,20–22: “Item alia probatio: factoris primi facere est facere
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The Fons vitae’s original version of the first proof claims that the substance
bearing the categories (substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta) cannot be
caused directly by God: indeed, if that were the case, it would have always been
by Him and it would have existed eternally, which is not true. Consequently,
God is not the maker of the souls, but there is a medium between them. In
Gundissalinus’sDeanima, this proof is developed in reference to the soul rather
than the substance bearing the categories: if the soul were created by God, it
would never leave Him. Then, Gundissalinus ‘completes’ the ambiguous pas-
sage of Fons vitae reading “non fuit semper” and “non semper fuit apud Deum,”
that is, interpreting the argument in a much more cosmological rather than
ontological sense. Consideration of this implies that God is not the maker of
the soul, but there must be a medium between them.
The second proof, too, is modified by Gundissalinus in an identical fashion.
In Fons vitae, the argument states that the substance bearing the nine cate-
gories cannot be created by God, since He only creates ex nihilo, while the
substance is composed of simple entities (matter and form). Gundissalinus
quotes this passage changing the substance bearing the categories with the
soul, and the reference to the simple entities with matter: since God only cre-
ates ex nihilo and the soul is created frommatter, the soul cannot be a product
of His agency.
These are just two examples of Gundissalinus’s attitude. All the six proofs
quoted in De anima, V, are based on the examination of the substance bear-
ing the nine categories, the first corporeal layer of reality, in order to show that
God cannot be the immediate cause of the corporeal substance. SinceGod can-
not be its cause, theremust be an intermediary: the spiritual substances, that is,
the hypostatical souls and the intelligence. Gundissalinus quotes some of these
arguments, but he constantly and consistently substitutes the substance bear-
ing the categories with the individual human soul (see Appendix, G–L). The
outcome is clear: since the souls cannot be caused by God, there must be an
intermediary creating them, media which are not the hypostatical substances
of the Fons vitae, but the angels.
This alteration strategy is neither casual nor isolated in Gundissalinus’s De
anima. To the contrary, it is a part of an overall change of perspective regarding
Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae and the positions previously held by Gundissalinus. In
his earlyworkDeunitate etuno, Gundissalinus indeedeagerly accepts thehypo-
aliquid ex nihilo; sed postea probabitur animam fieri ex materia; igitur non est factura
primi factoris.”
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statical cosmology presented in the Fons vitae, explicitly referring to the forms
of the four spiritual substances and the progressive ontological degradation of
matter and form.59
In De anima, Gundissalinus starts to change his mind regarding some main
aspects of his previous interpretation of Fons vitae. Gabirolian cosmology, and
its hypostases, are abandoned, while the doctrine of universal hylomorphism
is read through a much more logical interpretation. Gundissalinus, though,
does not cease to use Ibn Gabirol as a main source: he just re-interprets and
re-shapes arguments and doctrinal points. This is the case of the proofs of
the angelic creation of the souls presented in De anima, V, but this approach
is in place also with the demonstrations of the hylomorphic composition of
the soul presented in De anima, VII, where Gundissalinus cherry-picks twenty-
three arguments from Fons vitae, III and IV.60 In their original Gabirolian
context, these arguments are referred to the hylomorphic composition of the
hypostases, while in De anima they become proofs of the hylomorphic compo-
sition of the individual souls.
In other words, Gundissalinus ‘individualizes’ Ibn Gabirol’s psychological
hypostases, straining the arguments of the Fons vitae into an entirely differ-
ent perspective. Thanks to this ‘psychologization’ of Gabirolian cosmology,
Gundissalinus can insert the set of proofs demonstrating that the individ-
ual soul is directly caused by the angelic intelligence and indirectly by God.
Through this reduction of the psychological hypostases to the individual souls,
Gundissalinus builds up the first part of his account for the creation of the
souls: they cannot be created by God, but through some mediation. This is the
general outcome of the proofs presented in De anima, V.
In Gundissalinus’s interpretation of Ibn Gabirol, this mediating role cannot
be pursued by the hypostatical souls: Gundissalinus, indeed, identifies these
entities with the individual souls. Neither can this be nature, since Gundissal-
inus already refuted this possibility. Therefore, in Gabirolian terms, the only
remaining spiritual entity which can perform the mediated causation of the
souls is the hypostatical intelligence. This is the second part of Gundissali-
nus’s doctrine of the origin of the souls, that is, the identification between
intelligence and angels. The roots of this identification are grounded on Avi-
cenna (and possibly al-Ghazālī and Ibn Daud): indeed, Gundissalinus clearly
identifies separate intelligence and angels in De anima as well as in De pro-
cessione mundi, where he indifferently uses the two terms to refer to the same
59 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,1–5.
60 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 148,6–160,24.
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being. Moreover, in De anima, Gundissalinus explicitly refers to Avicenna’s
agent intelligence, stating that the soul will join the agent intelligence after the
death of the body:
But when the soul will be freed from the body and the accidents of the
body, it will be able to join the agent intelligence, and then, it will find
intelligible beauty and perennial delight in it, as we have said in the right
place.61
Nevertheless, neither the most characteristic of Avicenna’s psychological doc-
trines is exempt from Gundissalinus’s eagerness in melting together Avicenna
and Ibn Gabirol. In fact, it is worth noticing that the very first explicit reference
to the agent intelligence in Gundissalinus’s De anima is a direct quotation from
a peculiar passage of Fons vitae:
Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae Gundissalinus, De anima
It is necessary that the lower is hyle for
the higher, because the higher acts on the
lower. Therefore, the wise men wanted
to call any of the substances “form” with
the highest certitude except the first
intelligence, which is called “the agent
intelligence” by them.62
It is necessary, indeed, that the lower is
something like matter (quasi materia)
for the higher, for the higher acts on the
lower. In fact, the wise men did not want
to call any of the substances “form” with
the highest simplicity except the first
intelligence, which is called “the agent
intelligence” by them.63
61 Gundissalinus, De anima, 288,11–14: “Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore et ab acci-
dentibus corporis, tunc poterit coniungi intelligentiae agenti et tunc inveniet in ea pul-
chritudinem intelligibilem et delectationem perennem sicut dicemus suo loco.”
62 Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 294,14–17: “Oportet ut inferius sit hyle superiori, quia superius est
agens in inferiori. Et ideo sapientes voluerunt appellare aliquam substantiarum formam
certissime, nisi intelligentiam primam, quae vocatur ab eis intelligentia agens.” English
translation by Laumakis (readapted), 236.
63 Gundissalinus, De anima, 118,18–21: “Oportet enim ut inferius sit quasi materia superiori
eo quod superius agit in inferius et ideo sapientes noluerunt appellare aliquam substan-
tiarum formam simpliciter, nisi intelligentiam primam quae vocatur ab eis intelligentia
agens.”
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It should also be noticed that Gundissalinus’s quotation is slightly different
from Ibn Gabirol’s text, in both the letter and the spirit. In the first place, the
Toledan philosopher changes the reference to hyle with quasi materia, follow-
ing his general aim at resolving, in De anima, some fundamental problems of
coherence intrinsic to the Fons vitae.64 More importantly, though, through the
quotation of this passage Gundissalinus establishes a direct link between the
Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae and Avicenna’s De anima. While in Fons vitae that pas-
sage finds no development elsewhere in that work, in Gundissalinus’s treatise
it performs a kind of first introduction to the discussion of the agent intelli-
gence, which is one of the main features of the last chapter of Gundissalinus’s
De anima, where he discusses, through Avicenna, the gnoseological process of
intellectual knowledge.65
Furthermore, this passage not only bounds Ibn Gabirol and Avicenna, but
also provides a crucial link between Ibn Gabirol’s hypostatical intelligence and
Avicenna’s angelic intelligence, which Gundissalinus unifies in his personal
development of how the souls are created. All thismakes clear that Gundissali-
nus is identifying Avicenna’s separate intelligenceswith IbnGabirol’s hypostat-
ical intelligence as the direct cause of the creation of the human souls.
6 Conclusion
Gundissalinus’s theory of the angelic creation of the souls is a peculiar and out-
standing case of philosophical appropriation, based on a specific hermeneutic
of Avicenna and Ibn Gabirol developed through three main steps:
1. the reduction of Ibn Gabirol’s hypostatical souls (rational, sensible, and
vegetative) to the individual souls (rational, sensible, and vegetative),
which are created by the separated causes, that is, the intelligences;
2. the identification of Avicenna’s separate intelligences moving the
spheres—and, in particular, the most important of them, the giver of
forms—with, on the one hand, the angelic creatures, as presented by al-
Ghazālī, Ibn Daud, and Avicenna himself, and, on the other hand, with
Ibn Gabirol’s hypostatical intelligence, the first entity proceeding from
God’s creation of matter and form;
3. the radical application of Avicenna’s account of the creation of the souls
to Ibn Gabirol’s universal hylomorphism, in base of which the souls can-
64 See Polloni, Glimpses of the Invisible.
65 See Gundissalinus, De anima, 262,1–266,3.
338 polloni
Oriens 47 (2019) 313–347
not be created but by the angels, for they are composed of matter and
form, regardless Avicenna’s argument of the impossibility of psychologi-
cal matter.
The outcome of this interpretative process is the formulation of a doctrine
extremely consistent with Gundissalinus’s cosmology and ontology presented
in his De processione mundi. But it is also a doctrine which, although being
textually grounded on two main sources, cannot be resolved in any of them.
Gundissalinus’s alteration strategy, presiding his philosophical appropriation
of Arabic doctrines and texts, makes enough clear how far Gundissalinus’s
works are frombeing categorised as collationes. Thorough textual and doctrinal
analyses eminently display that quotation means interpretation, and in phi-
losophy, interpretation usually means an entirely new system which must be
assessed and analyzed stressing the relation to its sources, avoiding any temp-
tation to aprioristically resolve it into them.
More importantly, Gundissalinus’s doctrine of the origin of the souls offers
a glimpse of the first reception and interpretation of key doctrines of the Ara-
bic tradition within the Latin speculation. Avicenna’s radical (and complex)
position on the origin of the human souls would undergo a process of progres-
sive elaboration in the thirteenth century, as well as Ibn Gabirol’s ontology. It
is worth noting that, a few decades later, the authors of the Summa Halensis
would feel the urgency to dissipate any doubt concerning the angelic creation
of the souls.66 According to the Summa, it is possible to speak about such a cre-
ation only in a weak sense, that is, only in reference to the gnoseological role
played by the angels on the human soul. Another sense onwhich this assertion
can be correctly interpreted is in reference to the movement of the spheres
which prepares the bodies to the reception of their souls. Also in this second
weak sense, it is possible to speak of creation aliquo modo loquendo and valde
66 Auctores varii, Summa Fratris Alexandri, published under the title Alexander of Hales,
Summa theologica, ed. by Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii
Sancti Bonaventurae, 1928), II, 1, 4, tr. 2, s. 1, q. 1, c. 1, 504: “Secundum autem quod ‘creare’
dicitur quandoque communiter, prout dicitur productio in esse cuiuscumque sive sub-
stantiae sive accidentis, secundum quod dicit Psalmista: ‘Emitte spiritum tuum et cre-
abuntur,’ scilicet quantumad innovationem inbonis operibus, sic potest dici quod animae
creantur ab angelis, quia multae innovationes fiunt in animabus mediantibus angelis, a
quibus animae frequenter recipiunt illuminationes; sed prout ‘creare’ dicitur proprie pro-
ductio rei de nonente in ens, sic est falsum. Aliter etiam potest intelligi et habet verum
intellectum secundum ponentes intelligentias esse motores orbium caelestium, quia,
cum motu orbium fiunt corpora organizata et sic disponuntur et aptantur ad animarum
susceptionem, cum huiusmodi motus fiat ab intelligentiis, secundum hanc opinionem,
aliquo modo loquendo, sed valde per accidens, potest dici animas creatas esse ab intelli-
gentiis.”
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per accidens. To the contrary, the author underlines that, “if with creation we
mean the exact production of a thing from non-being to be, that assertion is
false.”67
Just a fewdecades afterGundissalinus’sDeanima, thedoctrine of the angelic
creation of human souls was one of the possible outcomes of the reading of
Arabic sources and, primarily, Avicenna’sDeanima.While a study on the actual
influence of his thought in the thirteenth century is still a desideratum, the
mediated or immediate influence of Gundissalinus’s reflection in the follow-
ing decades could provide invaluable data to our understanding of the Latin
reception of Arabic philosophy in the Middle Ages.
67 Auctores varii, Summa Fratris Alexandri, 504: “… sed prout ‘creare’ dicitur proprie produc-
tio rei de non ente in ens, sic est falsum.”
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Appendix
Gundissalinus and Avicenna
Avicenna, De anima, V, 3 Gundissalinus, De anima, V
A Dicemus autem quod anima humana non fuit
prius existens per se et deinde venerit in corpus:
animae enim humanae unum sunt in specie et
definitione; si autem posuerimus quod prius
habuerunt esse per se et non inceperunt cum
corporibus, impossibile est tunc ut animae in
ipso esse habeant multitudinem.68
Dixerunt enim: licet ponamus animas humanas
prius extitisse et non incepisse cum corporibus,
eas tamen ante corpora multas fuisse impossi-
bile est.69
B Multitudo enim rerum aut est ex essentia et
forma, aut est ex comparatione quae est ad
materiam et originemmultiplicatam ex locis
quae circumdant unamquamquemateriam
secundum aliquid aut ex temporibus propriis
uniuscuiusque illarum quae accidunt illis acci-
dentibus, aut ex causis dividentibus illam. Inter
animas autem non est alteritas in essentia et
forma: forma enim earum una est. Ergo non est
alteritas nisi secundum receptibile suae essen-
tiae cui comparatur essentia eius proprie, et hoc
est corpus.70
Multitudo enim rerum vel est ex essentia et
forma, vel ex comparatione admateriam et orig-
inemmultiplicatam locis circumscribentibus
unamquamquemateriam secundum aliquid, vel
ex temporibus propriis uniuscuiusque illarum
quae accidunt illis accidentibus, vel ex causis
dividentibus illam. Inter animas autem ante cor-
pora non fuit alteritas in essentia vel in forma.
Forma enim earum una est, quoniam omnes
humanae animae unum sunt in specie et def-
initione; ergo non est alteritas inter illas nisi
secundum receptibile suae essentiae, cui debe-
tur essentia eius proprie quod est corpus.71
C Si autem anima esset tantum absque corpore,
una anima non posset esse alia ab alia numero.
Et hoc generaliter est in omnibus; ea enim quo-
rum essentiae sunt intentiones tantum et sunt
multa, quorummultiplicatae sunt species in suis
singularibus, non est eorummultitudo nisi ex
sustinentibus tantum et receptibilibus et patien-
tibus ex eis, aut ex aliqua comparatione ad illa
aut ad tempora eorum. Cum enim nudae fuerint
omnino, non different per id quod diximus; ergo
impossibile est inter illas esse alteritatem et
multitudinem. Ergo destructum est iam animas
Ergo si animae fuerunt ante corpora, profecto
una non fuit alia numero ab alia; quia non fuit
alteritas vel multitudo inter illas; itaque non
fuerunt multae ante corpora.72
68 Avicenna, De anima, V, 3, 105,40–44.
69 Gundissalinus, De anima, 124,10–12.
70 Avicenna, De anima, V, 3, 105,44–106,52.
71 Gundissalinus, De anima, 124,12–126,3.
72 Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,4–6.
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Avicenna, De anima, V, 3 Gundissalinus, De anima, V
priusquam ingrederentur corpora fuisse multas
essentialiter.73
Avicenna, De anima, V, 4 Gundissalinus, De anima, V
D … et propter hoc etiam quod si possibile esset
unamquamque animam creari et non crearetur
id in quo perficitur et operatur, otiosum esset
eius esse (nihil autem otiosum vel superfluum
est in natura); quandoquidem ergo hoc est impos-
sibile, tunc in eis quae sunt non est possibilitas
huius; sed cum fit aptitudo recipiendi animam
et aptitudo instrumentorum, comitatur tunc
creari a causis separatis illud quod est anima.
Hoc autem non contingit in anima tantum, sed
in omnibus formis habentibus initium quarum
esse non praeponderat supra earum non esse,
nisi quia materia aptior est quantum ad illas et
dignior illis.74
Item, si possibile esset unamquamque animam
creari ante corpus in quo perficitur et operatur,
profecto otiosum esset eius esse; nihil autem
otiosum vel superfluum est in natura; ergo non
fuerunt creatae ante corpora.75
Avicenna, De anima, V, 3 Gundissalinus, De anima
E Dicemus etiam esse impossibile ut essentia eius
sit una numero: cum enim fuerint duo corpora,
acquirentur eis duae animae, quae duae aut
erunt partes illius unius animae, et tunc aliq-
uid quod non habet magnitudinem necmolem
erit divisibile in potentia (huius autem destructio
manifesta est ex principiis praepositis in natural-
ibus et in aliis), aut illa anima una numero erit
in duobus corporibus, hoc etiam per se patet
falsum esse.76
Sed nec fuit creata una numero. Cum enim gen-
erantur duo corpora, infunduntur eis duae
animae, quae duae animae vel sunt partes
illius unius animae, et sic aliquid quod non
habet molem vel magnitudinem est divisibile
in potentia, quod impossibile est; vel illa anima
una numero est in duobus corporibus, quod iam
superius improbatum est.77
73 Avicenna, De anima, V, 3, 106,52–62.
74 Avicenna, De anima, V, 4, 116,88–117,97.
75 Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,7–10.
76 Avicenna, De anima, V, 3, 107,63–69.
77 Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,10–14.
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Avicenna, De anima, V, 4 Gundissalinus, De anima
F Cum enim creaturmateria corporis quod sit
dignum fieri instrumentum animae et eius reg-
num, tunc causae separatae quae solent dare
unamquamque animam, creant animam. Ergo
ut animas creent sine corporibus quibus propria
sit, creatio unius et non alterius, est impossibile;
et praeter hoc etiam iam negavimus in praemis-
sis animas ante corpora esse multas numero; et
propter hoc etiam quod necesse est ut quicquid
incipit esse, praecedat illud materia quae sit apta
recipere illud aut apta comparari ad illud, sicut
ostendimus alias; …78
Igitur ante corpora animae non fuerunt una
nec multae. Quod autem non est unum vel
multa, non est; quicquid enim est, unum est
vel multa; nullo modo igitur fuerunt ante cor-
pora. Quapropter consequitur ut cotidie creentur
novae animae; cum enim creatur corpus quod sit
dignum fieri instrumentum et regnum eius,
tunc causae intelligibiles quae solent dare
unamquamque animam creant eam. Ergo ut
anima creetur sine corpore ita ut ipsa creetur et
non in corpus, hoc est impossibile.79
Gundissalinus and Ibn Gabirol
Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae Gundissalinus, De anima
G Et si factor primus fuerit factor substantiae per
se, tunc haec substantia fuit semper apud deum.
Sed haec substantia non fuit semper. Ergo non
est facta ab essentia factoris primi. Ergo fac-
tor primus non est factor substantiae per se. Et
cum factor primus non fuerit factor eius per se,
necesse erit ut sit medium inter illa.80
Probant autem philosophi animas non a Deo
sed ab angelis creari hoc modo: si factor primus
est factor animae per se, tunc anima semper
fuit apud eum; sed anima non semper fuit apud
Deum quoniam cotidie creantur novae; igitur
anima non est facta a primo factore, nec primus
factor est factor eius per se. Igitur necesse est ut
aliquid sit medium inter Deum et animam, quod
sit factor animae.81
H Facere factoris primi est creare aliquid ex nihilo.
Et substantia quae sustinet praedicamenta com-
posita est ex suis simplicibus. Ergo non est creata
ex nihilo.82
Item alia probatio: factoris primi facere est
facere aliquid ex nihilo; sed postea probabitur
animam fieri exmateria; igitur non est factura
primi factoris.83
78 Avicenna, De anima, V, 4, 115,80–116,88.
79 Gundissalinus, De anima, 126,14–21.
80 Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 78,7–12.
81 Gundissalinus, De anima, 128,17–22.
82 Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 79,18–20.
83 Gundissalinus, De anima, 130,20–22.
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Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae Gundissalinus, De anima
I Et omne quod exit de potentia in effectum, non
trahit illud in effectum nisi quod habet esse
in effectu. Ergo passionem substantiae quae
sustinet praedicamenta non trahid de potentia
in effectum nisi quod habet esse in effectu, inter
quod et illam non est medium. Item praepono
hanc et dico: Progressio passionis substantiae
quae sustinet praedicamenta de potentia in
effectum est a re quae habet esse in effectu,
inter quam et illam non est medium. Et factor
primus non est in potentia nec in effectu. Ergo
progressio passionis substantiae quae sustinet
praedicamenta de potentia in effectum non est
ex primo factore sine medio, quod sit inter illa.84
Item creari vel fieri est exire de potentia ad effec-
tum. Nihil autem exit de potentia ad effectum
nisi per aliud quod est in effectu; primus vero
factor nec est in potentia nec in effectu; igitur
per illum non exit anima de potentia ad effec-
tum. Ergo non creatur ab illo.85
J Substantia quae movet substantiam quae
sustinet praedicamenta non potest esse quin
sit aut mobilis aut immobilis. Si fuerit immo-
bilis, non potest per eammoveri substantia
quae sustinet praedicamenta, hoc est, quia
haec substantia aut potest moveri, aut non. Si
potest moveri haec substantia, esset mobilis. Si
non potest moveri in se, non esset possibile ut
moveret aliud. Probatio autem quod impossibile
est utmotor substantiae sit potens eammovere,
cum non sit potens se movere, erit hoc modo:
Ponamus quod id quod movet substantiam non
potest se movere. Et omne quod non potest se
movere, non potest movere aliud. Ergo quod
posuimus motorem substantiae sit movens eam
et in se non sit mobilis. Ergo non est possibile ut
motor substantiae sit movens eam et in se non
sit mobilis. Ergo motor substantiae mobilis est.
Et probatio etiam quodmotor substantiae qui
dat substantiae virtutemmovendi sit mobilis
erit hoc modo: Motor substantiae dat substantiae
virtutemmovendi. Et quicquid attribuit aliquid
alicui alii, dignius est ad habendam rem tribu-
tam eo quod accipit. Ergo motor substantiae qui
Item creare vel facere est trahere de potentia ad
effectum; sed trahere de potentia ad effectum
est movere; igitur quaecumquae res creat ani-
mammovet eam. Sed quicquid creandomovet
eam, necesse est ut sit mobile vel immobile. Si
autem fuerit immobile in se, tunc non poterit
moveri; si autem non poterit moveri, tunc nec
a se poterit moveri nec ab alio. Quod autem se
non potest movere, multo minus et aliud; igi-
tur quodmovet animam non est immobile in se;
igitur est mobile. Sed Deus est immobilis; igitur
nonmovet eam; et si nonmovet eam, utique nec
eam creat.86
84 Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 83,10–20.
85 Gundissalinus, De anima, 132,1–4.
86 Gundissalinus, De anima, 132,5–13.
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Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae Gundissalinus, De anima
tribuit substantiae virtutemmovendi dignior
est ad habendam virtutemmovendi quam ipsa
substantia quae accepit. Ergomotor substantiae
sine mediante mobilis est. Et praeponam hanc
conclusionem et dicam: substantia quae movet
substantiam nullo mediante, mobilis est. Et fac-
tor primus non est mobilis. Ergo factor primus
non estmotor substantiae sine medio.87
K Omne quod recipit aliquid ex alio nullo medi-
ante, non invenitur aliquid aliud dignius eo ad
receptionem eius. Si substantia quae sustinet
praedicamenta recipit substantialitatem a
primo factore nullo mediante, tunc non inven-
itur alia substantia dignior ea ad intentionem
substantialitatis. Sed substantia simplex, ut
anima et intelligentia, dignior est ad inten-
tionem substantialitatis quam substantia quae
sustinet praedicamenta. Ergo substantia quae
sustinet praedicamenta a primo factore non
recipit substantialitatem nullo mediante.88
Item ad recipiendum aliquid ab aliquo, nihil est
dignius eo quod illud recipit nullo mediante. Si
igitur anima recipit esse a primo factore nullo
mediante, tunc nihil est dignius ea ad recipien-
dum illud ab illo; sed substantia intelligentiae
dignior est ad hoc; ergo anima non recipit esse a
primo factore nullo mediante.89
L Quodmovet substantiam quae sustinet
praedicamenta nullo mediante, non potest esse
infinitum, quia non potest esse quin moveat aut
per se, aut per accidens. Et si movet illam per
suam essentiam, et essentia eius est infinita, non
est possibile ut motus qui exit ab ea sit finitus.
Sedmotus substantiae est finitus. Ergo essentia
quae movet eam non est infinita. Et si per acci-
dens movet, essentia eius etiam non est infinita,
quia omne quod est infinitum, non accedit ei
accidens. Et probabtio huius hoc modo fit: res
quae est infinita nonmutatur. Et omne cui
accedit accidens mutatur. Ergo rei infinitae non
accedit accidens. Ergo non est possibile ut quod
movet substantiam nullo mediante sit infini-
tum. Ergo est finitum. Et praeponimus hanc et
dicimus: quodmovet substantiam quae sustinet
praedicamenta nullo mediante est finitum. Et
Item quicquid movet animam non potest esse
infinitum quoniam quicquid movet aliud aut
movet per se aut per accidens. Si autem id quod
infinitum est movet aliud per se, necesse est
ut motus, qui ab eo fit, sit infinitus; sed motus
animae finitus est; igitur non fit ab infinito. Si
autemmovet illud per accidens, tunc essentia
eius non est infinita, quod sic probatur: nulli
quod infinitum est advenit accidens; id enim
quod infinitum est nonmutatur; sed omne cui
accidens advenit mutatur; igitur infinito non
accidit accidens. Igitur quodmovet animam
nullo mediante non potest esse infinitum; est
igitur finitum.
Item quodmovet animam nullo mediante
est finitum; sed primus factor non est finitus;
igitur factor primus nonmovet animam nullo
mediante.
87 Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 92,11–93,8.
88 Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae, 90,27–91,6.
89 Gundissalinus, De anima, 132,14–19.
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Ibn Gabirol, Fons vitae Gundissalinus, De anima
factor primus est infinitus. Ergo factor primus
non est movens substantiam nullo mediante.
Item alio ordine. Si motor substantiae nullo
mediante est infinitus, motus substantiae est
infinitus. Sed non est possibile ut motus sub-
stantiae sit infinitus, eo quod substantia eius
finita est. Ergo non est possibile ut motor huius
substantiae sine mediante sit infinitus. Deinde
adiungemus huic conclusioni hanc dictionem,
scilicet: factor primus est infinitus. Ergo non est
possibile ut factor primus sitmotor substantiae
nullo mediante.90
Item si motor animae est infinitus, et motus ani-
mae est infinitus; sed motus animae non potest
esse infinitus quoniam substantia eius finita est;
igitur; motor animae nullo mediante non potest
esse infinitus; sed factor primus est infinitus; igi-
tur; factor primus non potest essemotor animae
nullo mediante.91
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